The State of the Situation

In the rush to cope with (and hopefully say something interesting really quickly about) the WikiLeaks phenomenon, I feel that many mainstream commentators have missed a major point that demands first observation and then discussion. There will of course be endless debate as to whether this or that leak was in the public interest, but these debates fail to observe the fundamental structural change that is occurring to the relations of international and domestic governance as a result of this saga.

While open government is a nice idea that will always be floated at opportune moments like this by those that seek to advance their substantive agendas (I am not arguing that this is a bad thing), the founding argument of modern political theory is that security is the main reason that a government exists in the first place. That is, people are not necessarily in the best position to judge, or defend personally, their security interests, and so they must abdicate some of their personal freedom in this regard to a ruler or executive in order that these decision be made to an extent for them. Thus, we will find it a systematic fact of modern statehood that openness will tend to end where security claims and executive government begin (a recent example might be the Belal Khazaal case in NSW where Khazzal was convicted on charges of ‘making a document knowing it could assist in a terrorist act and inciting terrorism’ - part of the post-9/11 legal framework - without his defence lawyer in fact having access to the documents in question, on grounds of national security). The ‘national security’ trump is not merely a potent weapon in debates (in court etc), but the only trump that matters, because from security flows everything else that we value. Security precedes the liberal rights and freedom that we happily enjoy. Thus all rights claims are potentially mediated by judgements of security and security risk. Taken to its logical and apparently perverse conclusions (notably by Nazi jurist Carl Schmitt) it has been argued that this is the only decision that matters, and that all of our cherished liberal rights and freedoms are only temporary and illusory.

So how are we to judge if this security ‘trump’ is being played fairly? Well under normal conditions we simply cannot, by definition. The (claimed) reason the information cannot be released is because it would threaten further national security interests, and you as a citizen (or even a politician or judge) have no ground to make an informed decision regarding the appropriateness of this judgment, because you cannot see the information unless it is released. In a sense we just trust (or hope) that a ‘balance’ between liberty and security is handled in a just fashion by the institutions of executive government. Hopes for further openness in this area appear without foundation unless you are willing to argue for the end of the modern sovereign state system. As Rahul Sagar has noted in a recent Polity article, any ‘balance’ struck between what we see as our rightful liberties and the state’s legitimate right of self defense from domestic or foreign security threats is necessarily skewed by the institution of state secrecy. The fact is that someone will have to make a discretionary judgment regarding what information can be safely released and what cannot. He also argues (and I agree) that this is to a great extent inescapable, unless you are willing to argue that all information should be available to all people at all times, a position that is impossible to defend.

However, we may be seeing the beginning of a structural change that could put that all in jeopardy (which is a good or a bad thing depending on your point of view). We have yet to see the result of the inevitable ‘counter-offensive’ by sovereign states in pursuit of returning the power relations of information to the very recently past status quo, but it appears there is something different this time. While people have been prophesising the downfall of the sovereign state as a result of globalisation since, well, the phenomenon of globalisation, this challenge (at least with regards to informational asymmetry) appears substantial indeed.

The openness and adaptability of the internet has consistently bucked attempts to control it. The internet is for all intents and purposes, in the Western world at least, immanent and decentred, and thus short of turning off the power (everywhere) there has been no way found yet to consistently control it. When Napster was shut down, it spawned a thousand clones that saw P2P file sharing become an institution of the internet. This, along with MySpace and its clones, have undermined the record industry to the point that artists are touring constantly because record sales are at an all time low. Efforts to paywall music and news have proved only mildly successful. Open-source communities revolutionised programming, spawning Wikipedia, Open Office and Mozilla. The ability of the internet to copy and distribute information is unprecedented, and this was evident in the speed at which the WikiLeaks information was distributed to thousands of mirrors across the globe in preparation for Assange’s arrest. How do you control something of that speed and efficiency? We are only just beginning to see the real political implications of such technology, which has up until now simply made communication quicker and easier and provided more ways to use our ample leisure time.

For those wondering whether or not their governments are striking a legitimate balance between security and liberty (not to mention how they are behaving in foreign conflicts), there is now an astoundingly greater quantity of information on which to make this judgement. In the future there is potentially an anonymous outlet for agents within the executive asking themselves the same question (although they managed to catch Bradley Manning).

That is why Hilary Clinton et al are upset. Not because of a few errant cables that appear embarrassing but really tell us nothing we didn’t know, but because the state has perhaps seen the beginning of a phenomenon that could see it cede its role of information ‘gatekeeper’ to an unpredictable, uncontrollable and thoroughly decentred entity. This new monitory function is certainly a significant challenge to the institutions of modern statehood. Whether or not this challenge is a victory for democratic ideals or actually inimical to their very foundations will only be seen in time.